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Abstract:  Since African-Americans began competing in elections in majority 
white districts, researchers have postulated that some whites were reticent to tell 
pollsters that they intended to vote for the white candidate, causing polling to be 
inaccurate.  Prior to 2006, it was difficult to determine empirically whether the 
Bradley Effect existed, and if it did, how powerful of a factor it was, since there 
were relatively few cases to examine.  This study examines the 2006 electoral 
contests that pitted African-Americans versus whites, and analyzes the 
Democratic primaries and caucuses in the 2008 presidential race.  We find that a 
Bradley Effect did exist in about half of the 2006 elections and in about one 
quarter of the 2008 primaries. However, a ‘reverse’ Bradley Effect occurred about 
as often.  
 
  
Ronald J. Vogel & Phillip Ardoin 
 
2 
 
n the 1982 California gubernatorial election, the mayor of Los 
Angeles, Thomas Bradley, held a compelling lead in polling through 
election day, but was defeated by 100,000 votes to George 
Deukmejian, a white conservative Republican.  Thus was borne the term 
‘Bradley Effect’ (Citrin, Green, & Sears, 1990), an expression based upon the 
premise that some white voters indicates to pollsters a preference for the 
candidate of color or indicate that they are undecided. Ultimately, however, they 
pull the lever for the white candidate once they are in the privacy of the voting 
booth.  In subsequent campaigns, election results have indicated the 1982 
Bradley Effect was not an isolated incident.  Two of the more notable elections in 
which the “Bradley Effect” has been acknowledged are the 1989 Virginia 
gubernatorial election and the 1992 Illinois Senate election. 
 
 In order for an election to be characterized as influenced by the Bradley 
Effect, two critical conditions must be met.  First, the election must pit a white 
candidate against an African-American.  Second, there must be a perception that 
the election is competitive so polling is conducted prior to Election Day.  In a 
typical election year, very few contests meet both of these criteria.  However, the 
2006 election cycle changed this trend by presenting seven competitive statewide 
elections with African-American candidates challenging white candidates in 
competitive elections.  We will examine each of these races to determine which, 
if any, presented a Bradley Effect scenario. 
 
 We then turn our attention to the contest for the 2008 Presidential 
Democratic Party Nomination, which includes an African American candidate, 
Barack Obama.  This unique and extended competition provides several 
opportunities to examine the extent in which the Bradley Effect continues in 
contemporary American politics.  Barack Obama has faced a series of elections 
against white opponent(s) and polling has been conducted in many of these 
contests.  Thus, we are able to determine if, and where, the Bradley Effect 
continues.  
 
 As well as examining the extent to which the Bradley Effect continues, 
this research subdivides the Presidential nominating contests in a number of ways.  
First, we examine (if a Bradley Effect does exist) whether it is more prone to 
occur in caucus states or in primary states.  We then analyze the Democratic 
Presidential nomination contests on a number of factors including: 
 
 Geography, i.e., the different regions of the nation. 
 Race, i.e., African-American and Hispanic percentage in each state. 
 Age, i.e., percentage of elderly voters in each state. 
 Urbanization, i.e., the percentage of voters residing in urban areas in 
each state. 
 
 I
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 We plan to compare polling results (as tabulated by Real Clear Politics) 
with the final vote percentages received by Barack Obama for each of the above 
factors.  The results of our analysis will provide a direct examination of whether 
there has been a reduction in the Bradley Effect or whether it continues into the 
21st century.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1982, the California gubernatorial contest pitted Democrat Thomas 
Bradley, the African-American mayor of Los Angeles, against George 
Deukmejian, a white Republican, and the state Attorney General.  Polls prior to 
Election Day showed Bradley a sizable lead; however, on Election Day the voters 
chose Deukmejian.  Thus was borne the term ‘Bradley Effect’, which indicates 
that, for a subset of white voters, there is a reticence to indicate to pollsters that 
they oppose the African-American candidate although they have no intention of 
casting their ballot for him (or her).  It should be understood at the start that the 
Bradley effect is slightly different from an unwillingness of white voters to reject 
an African-American candidate solely based on race.  If a white voter plans to 
vote for a white candidate instead of an African-American primarily because of 
race, and accurately relates this choice to pollsters, this would not be 
characterized as the Bradley effect.  The Bradley effect, instead, deals with a 
problem that is important to election polling, i.e., white voters telling pollsters of a 
position that lacks veracity.  Now, this may seem a mundane topic, unless we 
examine how electioneering has been conducted in the United States during 
recent years.  For example, candidates make spending decisions in markets 
where additional advertising or campaign appearances will make the difference 
between winning and losing, or at least will induce their opponent expend 
resources to maintain their lead.  If polling is unreliable, resource allocation 
becomes more problematic.  The Bradley Effect also is important because it 
provides evidence that there may be an insidious racial problem in our nation.  
Unlike individuals who are unashamed of their racist views, there is another 
group who is aware their views are socially unacceptable and attempt to hide 
behind a veneer of toleration (Parks & Rachlinski, 2008).  
 
This study will serve a number of purposes that will aid in an 
understanding of the Bradley effect.  We will begin by examining in some detail 
electoral races where the Bradley effect has taken place in the last quarter century.  
We then examine each of the relevant races in 2006, which provided an ideal 
opportunity to observe whether the Bradley effect had continued unabated. The 
remainder of the paper is devoted to an in-depth examination of the contest for the 
2008 Democratic Presidential Party nomination. 
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THE BRADLEY EFFECT 
 
 There have been many African-Americans elected to the House of 
Representatives in the last thirty years. However, most have won in districts 
populated by a majority of African-American voters (Canon, 1999).  When 
African-Americans opt to run for elective office at either a state or a national 
level, obviously, they do not have a racial congruity with the majority of 
constituents.  For them to be victorious in these areas requires them to seek the 
support of white voters. This is a much more tenuous proposition for a variety of 
reasons (Highton, 2004).  
 
 There is a strong belief among many that white voters are very reluctant 
to vote for African-American candidates because of racial polarization (Lublin, 
1997).  This belief is central to the establishment of majority-minority districts 
since otherwise, it is thought, there would be few if any African-Americans 
serving in elective offices (Highton, 2004).  The primary rationale explained for 
this behavior is that white voters are prejudiced and their racial aversion to 
non-white candidates makes it very difficult for the election of minority 
candidates in multi-racial districts dominated by white constituents.  Researchers 
have shown there is reluctance for many white voters to support minority 
candidates.  In fact, studies have shown white support for African-American 
candidates is about 10% less than for white candidates from the same party 
(Bullock & Dunn, 1999; Gay, 1999).  
 
 We posit that much of the Bradley Effect may be determined by 
examining how voters which pollsters place as ‘undecided’ actually act in the 
confines of the voting booth.  If there were no Bradley Effect, we would expect 
these undecided voters to cast their ballots in similar numbers to those who have 
previously made their vote choice clear.  Any substantial difference from this, 
we claim, is potentially a Bradley Effect scenario. 
 
 Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous (1994) study in detail the issue of the 
difference between late deciding voters and those who made their preference 
weeks before they cast their ballot.  They note that based upon sixteen years of 
voting data, contrary to the dominant theme of the prevailing literature (Campbell 
et al, 1960), late deciders are not more cross-pressured by opposing goals than are 
other voters. However, they found these voters are less involved with the political 
system or have less attachment to candidates.  That is, they tend to have less faith 
that the political system will impact them, that is, which candidates are chosen 
actually matters in their own lives, and therefore, care little about the outcome of 
the election.  However, important for this research, ordinarily late deciders do 
not make a vote choice that is much different from others. 
 
 However, when we stir race into the mix, what effect does it have? 
Whites over the years have shown a noticeable decline in responding negatively 
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to racially sensitive issues (Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985) in public opinion 
surveys.  Perhaps, though, it is that whites are sophisticated enough to know 
views linked to racism are inappropriate, and, therefore, should remain hidden 
from public view.  This viewpoint, that the norms have changed and not the 
voters (Hagen, 1995), supports our hypothesis that undecided voters form the 
crux of the Bradley Effect.  The Bradley Effect concerned not just pollsters but 
also alarmed political strategists who, throughout the 1990’s, were convinced that 
an African-American candidate who did not have a majority in pre-election 
polling without any undecided voters was likely to lose (Moskowitz & Stroh, 
1994).   
 
 Thomas Bradley was first elected in 1973 to the office of Los Angeles 
mayor and remained in that office for the next twenty years.  In 1982, Bradley 
ran as the Democratic candidate for the California gubernatorial election against 
George Deukmejian.  Polling conducted in the months leading up to Election 
Day consistently showed Bradley with a large lead.  Exit polls replicated these 
predictions; some news organizations even predicted he had won on election 
night.  However, it turned out that in this remarkably close election the 
Republican candidate was ultimately victorious.  Although Bradley had lost the 
race, he found himself the namesake of a polling anomaly, the “Bradley Effect”, 
when voters tell pollsters that they intend to vote for an African-American 
candidate, but the results on election night indicate they actually voted for the 
white opponent. 
 
 In the 1989 Virginia governor’s race, polls showed that Douglas Wilder 
had a large lead over his Republican opponent, Marshall Coleman.  Once again, 
it turned out that the Bradley Effect had occurred.  Even though exit polls 
predicted a one-sided victory, Wilder, the African-American candidate, won by 
only .6% (Finkel, Guterbock, & Borg, 1991).  In 1990, polls predicted David 
Dinkins would win by 15% over Rudolph Giuliani in the New York City mayoral 
race.  As in the Wilder race in Virginia, Dinkins barely won much to the surprise 
of pollsters.  In that same year, and again in 1996 the African American 
candidate Harvey Gantt lost to Jesse Helms in a contest for the North Carolina 
U.S. Senate seat despite his lead in the pre-election polls.  The next major contest 
pitting an African-American candidate against a white candidate occurred in the 
1992 Illinois U.S. Senate race.  Carol Moseley Braun was an African-American 
state legislator who defeated the incumbent, Alan Dixon in the Democratic 
primary.  She then handily defeated her Republican opponent, Richard 
Williamson.  She ran for re-election six years later and was defeated in the 
general election by Peter Fitzgerald by 4% (Moskowitz & Stroh, 1994). 
 
 In each of these contests, the same blueprint emerged.  Richard Morin, 
polling director for the Washington Post, stated, “There's a pattern emerging 
here…It's as if you could throw all the undecideds to the White candidate (Baxter 
& Morris, 1989).”  The question that is important psychologically, is why would 
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individuals who do not really plan to vote for the African-American candidate, 
not honestly tell pollsters of their intentions (Parks & Rachlinski, 2008)?  
According to Berlinsky (1999), a subset of voters who believe it is socially 
unacceptable to state they oppose racially sensitive issues. Consequently,  
instead of saying that they oppose integration, they reply that they do not know if 
they favor it.  
 
 
THE 2006 CONTESTS 
 
 Prior to 2006 only one African-American, Douglas Wilder of Virginia, 
had ever been elected as a state Governor. Moreover, since Reconstruction, only 
three African-Americans have served in the United States Senate.  Until 2006, at 
most, there was only one gubernatorial or U.S. Senate races in any cycle featuring 
an African-American candidate who had a real chance of winning occurred in any 
electoral cycle was one.  A number of African-Americans had sought office and 
been elected in House districts, of course.  But most of these elections took place 
in districts where the voters were predominantly people of color. 
 
 The 2006 elections changed this scenario.  Six different 
African-Americans had realistic chances of winning the statewide seat for which 
they ran.  One, Kweisi Mfume, lost in a closely contested race for the Democratic 
nomination of a vacated U.S. Senate seat.  The other five ran in the general 
election and all, at one time or another during their race, were either leading or 
were close enough to foresee victory.  Surprisingly, of the five who ran in the 
general election, three were Republicans.  A roll call of the African-American 
candidates who ran in the general election follows:  
 
 Harold Ford – Ford, an African-American Congressman, faced Bob 
Corker in the race for the Tennessee Senate seat. Polling was relatively 
close throughout the contest.  The race appeared to turn in the last few 
weeks following an ad featuring a barely clothed blonde woman asking 
Ford to give her a call.  
 Lynn Swann – A Hall of Fame NFL wide receiver during the 1970’s, 
Swann was the Republican candidate for governor of Pennsylvania. 
Although a novice to the political arena, because of his high name 
recognition he was deemed by the Republican establishment as the 
candidate with the greatest opportunity to defeat Ed Rendell the 
incumbent governor.  
 Michael Steele – Steele was the incumbent Lieutenant Governor of 
Maryland when he decided to run as the Republican candidate for the 
United States Senate.  When he entered the race, it was unclear which 
Democrat he would face, Ben Cardin or Kweisi Mfume.  After a hard 
fought primary that went to Cardin, Steele hoped to garner much of the 
minority vote.  However, in a close contest, the Democrat won the 
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Senate seat.  
 Deval Patrick – Patrick served as the top civil rights attorney in the 
federal government under President Clinton.  He then became a 
business executive until he decided to run as the Democratic candidate 
for governor in Massachusetts.  Kerry Healey, his Republican 
opponent, suffered a number of missteps during her run.  Combined 
with the normal Democratic advantage in that state, Patrick won by a 
wide margin in November.  
 Kenneth Blackwell – Blackwell was twice elected to Ohio statewide 
office as a Republican before deciding to run for governor in 2006.  He 
faced Ted Strickland, a Democratic Congressman, in the November 
election.  At least in part, because of Ohio economic travails, and partly 
because of the role Blackwell played in the 2004 Presidential election for 
President Bush in the state, Strickland won.  
 
 
Table 1:  2006 African-American Candidates 
 
Candidate Polls Undecided Election Difference 
Share
Percent 
Difference 
Steele (MD) 45 6.3 45 -3.03 -6.72 
Ford (TN) 44.3 5.4 48 1.17 2.44 
Blackwell (OH) 37.3 6 37 -2.68 -7.25 
Swann (PA) 36 6.2 40 1.62 4.05 
Patrick (MA) 53.8 16.7 56 -8.59 -15.33 
 
 
 We see in Table 11 whether the Bradley Effect played any part in the 
final results of the 2006 state wide elections which included African American 
candidates.  It is important to keep in mind that it is not necessarily important 
whether or not a given candidate wins an election to discern if the Bradley Effect 
occurred.  Some elections, although competitive, are unlikely to be won by a 
candidate in some states, in some years, regardless of race. Witness Lynn 
Swann’s race in a Democratic year, in a Democratic state, against an incumbent 
Democratic governor.   Other candidates will win regardless of a Bradley Effect 
if the stars align in their favor.  Deval Patrick had a 24 point lead going into 
election day; although the Bradley Effect had a -15.33 effect on Patrick’s race, he 
still won by 12%. In fact, only Deval Patrick won his race; the other four African 
American candidates lost.  
 There was indeed a Bradley Effect evinced in some of the 2006 
elections.  We defined the Bradley Effect for elections which there was 5% or 
greater differential between the actual vote and pre-election polls.  The highest 
noted difference between the actual vote and pre-election polling was for Deval 
Patrick.  In his case, the difference between the pre-election polls and his actual 
vote percentage was 15.33%.  Blackwell (7.25%) and Steele (6.75%) also found 
that their results were considerably reduced as a consequence of the Bradley 
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Effect.  In fact, in all three of these cases, the African American candidate 
received, according to the polls, virtually NONE of the undecided vote.  This is a 
classic Bradley Effect. As stated earlier, normally we would expect the undecided 
voters to split in the same manner as those who had previously made their 
candidate selection. However, in each of these elections, the undecided voters all 
went to the opponent of the African-American candidate.  
 
 
2008 DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION CONTEST – BARACK OBAMA 
 
In 2004, Barack Obama, then an Illinois state senator, entered the race 
for the vacated Illinois senate race.  While he was handily winning the 
Democratic nomination, the Republican field devolved into chaos, as the 
frontrunner was forced to leave following evidence of sexual improprieties 
revealed by his ex-wife, actress Jeri Ryan.  The Democratic Party decided to 
highlight Obama’s campaign by permitting him to present a speech during prime 
time at the national convention.  This speech roused many who heard it, and 
instantly moved Barack Obama into the forefront of African-American leaders in 
the nation.  Meanwhile, the Republicans eventually chose as their nominee Alan 
Keyes, an African-American famous for his conservative views, who had run for 
president earlier in his career.  Obama differed from many other recent 
African-American political leaders.  His appeal was not primarily to other 
individuals of color.  Instead, his charisma, intelligence, and youth appealed to 
many young voters.  His early opposition to the Iraq War and the miasma over 
the American economy brought many individuals who sought change from the 
nature of American politics over the last 20 or so years of constant bickering over 
issues that bore little resemblance to the lives of average individuals.  Although 
he had little national political experience, he decided in 2007 to enter the 
Democratic Presidential nomination contest.  As well, Obama was perhaps the 
first African-American candidate for President for whom race was not THE 
central theme of his campaign.  For the others (Chisholm, Jackson, Sharpton), 
the issue of racial equality induced many blacks to support them; however, it may 
well have provoked a number of white voters, who might otherwise have 
supported them on other themes, to steer away.  Obama, though, did not 
emphasize civil rights, although he did not shy away from the issue when 
pressured.  At first, many observers believed U.S. Senator Hillary Rodham 
Clinton possessed an unshakeable lead for the nomination.  She had a number of 
assets:  because of her husband’s presidency, she had a connection to many other 
party leaders; as a U.S. Senator from New York, she had access to many of the 
media elites and the groups that had historically provided campaign funding; as 
the first woman to provide a substantial candidate for the presidency, she had a 
base of other women who were eager to serve in such a groundbreaking 
campaign.  She also had the early support of a large majority of 
African-Americans, despite Obama’s natural racial linkage to them.  The only 
objections to her presidential campaign, at first, was that she had little experience 
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of her own, that she voted for the Iraq War Resolution and because of a series of 
incidents during her husband’s tenure, there were doubts about her integrity.  As 
the war continued to devolve, though, and as Americans became less confident 
about the future, Clinton’s position as the presumptive leader became more 
tenuous.  To a great extent, because of a large outpouring of new voters, Obama 
won the Iowa caucus.  Then, Clinton reversed the polls, and was victorious in 
New Hampshire.  Her campaign began to unravel in South Carolina.  Her 
husband, who had been regarded as hero among many people of color, attempted 
to slight Obama’s efforts, and the African-American vote slid away from her.  As 
the campaign wore on, she became the candidate of experience and Obama 
positioned himself as the candidate associated with the idea of change.  Since 
their issue differences were virtually unnoticeable, their images determined the 
voting blocs associated with them.  Obama maintained the support of the well 
educated, the young, and African-Americans, while Clinton’s steadfast 
enthusiasts were white women, older voters, and Hispanics.  The battle 
continued from winter 2007 until the early summer of the 2008 election year with 
these two candidates.  One had a legacy of nearly twenty years of familial rule of 
the party.  The other, the insurgent, trying to wrest control from the king and 
queen, had amassed a coalition of well-educated whites and of 
African-Americans, both of which groups were seeking a new voice to lead the 
Democratic Party.  Following the South Carolina primary, the next significant 
event in the duel was what became known in the media as ‘Super Tuesday’, a 
conglomeration of primaries and caucuses all scheduled for the same day, 
February 5.  It was widely assumed by pundits that whichever candidate amassed 
the most delegates on this date would likely win the nomination.  However, 
neither candidate took an insurmountable lead on Super Tuesday.  Clinton 
concentrated on large states where she had many long-term allies who would 
assist her in getting out the vote.  Obama, though, sent his staff to small, 
otherwise neglected states where they usually received the lion’s share of the 
vote.  One reason neither side gained much is the Democratic Party’s unique 
method of counting delegates, whereby no states were winner takes all. Another 
was that each state had great latitude in determining exactly how its delegates 
were counted.  So, some states used systems that benefited Clinton while others 
used systems that advantaged Obama.  So, for example, a state that allocated 
delegates between Congressional districts equally would tend to benefit Clinton; 
one that provided extra delegates to districts that had a Democratic representative 
in Congress would benefit Obama since areas that had a concentration of 
African-American voters were more likely to have a Democratic member of the 
House.  Once both sides realized that neither had gained an advantage on Super 
Tuesday, they both began to take stock of their situation.  Clinton had run a 
traditional incumbent-style campaign; she had depended upon a relatively few 
large contributors and the endorsements of super-delegates to give her an early 
lead and intimidate any opponents.  Obama had run more as an outsider; he relied 
on the Internet to build enthusiasm among the young and catered the support of 
individuals who could not afford to provide the maximum legally permissible 
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($2300) but were willing to send small amounts of money. Neither side had set up 
campaigns in states after Super Tuesday either.  They employed different 
strategies at this point as well. Clinton had spent much of her massive funding 
hoping for a knockout punch on February 5.  Obama, since he was dependent on 
smaller contributors, continued to receive steady donations.  As well, since 
Clinton’s funding came from people who understood how politics worked, they 
were more likely to support her when she was leading than when she was fighting 
an uphill battle.  Obama’s individuals were more apt to be first time donors, so 
they were not reluctant to financially support a candidate, even if he should 
eventually not be successful.  For the next month, Obama won virtually every 
primary and caucus, most by very large margins.  That was what the Democratic 
Party rules rewarded, large victories.  Because of these victories, Obama 
amassed an unstoppable lead in delegates.  After that, until the nomination battle 
ended in early June, Clinton was defeated, except she refused to concede until the 
last primaries in Montana and South Dakota.  
 
 
THE BRADLEY EFFECT – RACIAL CONTEXTS 
 
 Many studies have examined the effect of racial factors upon white 
voters’ decision-making.  One set of research has looked upon the influence that 
race-framed issues stimulates whites to vote in a certain manner.  These issues 
range from affirmative action and busing to crime and property taxes.  A second 
avenue analyzes the motivation behind racially tinged voting to determine if 
people are voting because of their own personal self-interest or in concert with 
their white cohort.  Most studies have determined individual self-interest is much 
less apt to be the determinant of voting behavior than is group solidarity. Another 
school contends there is a strand of anti-African-American feelings which drives 
people’s vote choice.  This racism is more nuanced than evidenced in the 1950’s 
and 1960’s, and is termed ‘modern racism’ (Citrin, Green, & Sears, 1990).  What 
Citrin, Green and Sears (1990) examined is particularly pertinent to the case of 
Barack Obama and the 2008 election.  Studies have consistently shown that 
white support for an African-American candidate declines as the percentage of 
minority voters increases.  In line with threat theory, the idea is that, for many 
whites, their group pressures are exacerbated when the number of 
African-American voters presents a risk to the hegemony of whites, there is a 
large drop-off in white support (Liu, 2001). 
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PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES 
 
 Both political parties in the United States employ primaries and caucuses 
to determine the winner in a given state. Some states use a primary, some use a 
caucus, and some employ both.  The decision is left up to the state legislators, 
since a primary obviously costs more to conduct than does a caucus. The function 
they serve is to select nominees, increase voter enthusiasm, provide publicity and 
finances to the state party, and drive candidates from the race (Norrander, 1993).  
Although they have similar functions, there are important differences between 
caucuses and primaries.  While primary voters are similar in a number of 
respects to those from the party who vote in the general election, caucus voters 
differ in a number of respects.  These participants tend to be more energized, 
more partisan, and wealthier than typical voters. Candidates also view the 
contests differently.  Since a relatively low percentage of voters are likely to 
attend caucuses, organizational skills to induce likely proponents to attend their 
state caucus are important in determining success.  Primary triumphs, though, 
are more apt to be attained by advertising; if enough voters are energized, then a 
primary win can be accomplished (Norrander, 1989).  Obama clearly over 
performed in caucuses as compared to his primary performances.  In the thirteen 
state caucuses, he received over 60% of the vote in 8 (61.5%) of them. Primaries 
were much more challenging for him. Out of thirty-six primaries, Obama received 
over 60% of the vote in only 7 (19.4%).  This information fits well with existing 
theory. As stated earlier, those who vote in caucuses are prone to be more 
energized than those who choose not to be part of the process.  Obama’s 
campaign was dependent on building a level of excitement among advocates 
through the Internet and through a steady stream of e-mails to supporters.  When 
a contest was imminent in a state, multiple e-mails were sent daily in an attempt to 
build a level of excitement in their community.  As well, volunteers and paid 
staff called as many Democrats in a state as possible; then, on primary day, those 
who favored him were repeatedly called to ensure that everything possible had 
been done to get them to vote.  
 
 
Table 2:  Relationship between Type of Nomination Contest and  
Obama Performance 
 
 Caucus Primary Total 
Less Than 40% of the 
Total Vote  
7.7% 
(n=1) 
13.9% 
(n=5) 
12.2% 
(n=6) 
Between 40 -60% of 
the Total Vote 
30.8% 
(n=4) 
66.7% 
(n=24) 
57.1% 
(n=28) 
More Than 60% of the 
Total Vote 
61.5% 
(n=5) 
19.4% 
(n=7) 
30.6% 
(n=12) 
X2 = 7.98 sig < .05 
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 This same strategy was employed in primaries.  However, primaries 
require a minimal level of energy in support of a candidate compared to 
participation in a caucus. If a person can find less than an hour of free time on 
Election Day, they are able to fulfill their citizenship activity.  A caucus, though, 
at least this year, took up to six hours to complete, so it is easy to find excuses to 
not participate.  Therefore, in a primary setting, the organizational and 
enthusiasm advantages of the Obama campaign were minimized.  
 
 
Table 3:  Relationship between Type of Nomination Contest and Bradley Effect 
 
 Caucus Primary Total 
Negative Obama Projection  
 > 5%  
0 28.0% 
(n = 7) 
24.1% 
(n = 7) 
Obama Projection between 
 -5% and +5% 
0 44.0% 
(n = 11) 
37.9% 
(n = 11) 
Positive Obama Projection  
>  5% 
100% 
(n = 4) 
28.0% 
(n = 7) 
37.9% 
(n = 11) 
X2 = 7.59 sig < .05 
 
 
 When we examine whether the Bradley Effect is more likely to exhibit 
itself in primaries or caucuses, one stark fact is obvious.  The 2008 Democratic 
nomination contest must have been a political pollster’s nightmare, if their goal 
was accuracy.  Not only was one of the candidates an enigmatic, charismatic 
African-American, his primary competitor was one of the most well known 
women in American political life, whose husband happened to be the last 
Democratic president.  Thus, not only was there a potential Bradley Effect, there 
was a potential gender effect similar to a Bradley Effect, and whatever effect 
President Clinton would have on respondents. Yet, of the 29 nominating contests 
for which there was polling, only 7 found a noticeable under-polling for Barack, 
all of which were primaries.  In an additional 11 contests (4 caucuses and 7 
primaries), Obama did better than the pollsters anticipated.  So, in the four 
caucuses for which there was polling, Obama’s vote total over-produced in each.  
Of the 25 primaries that were polled, Obama under-polled in seven and 
over-polled in seven.  We have already discussed our rationale for the caucus 
errors, the youthful energy of his followers, his team’s advantage in 
organizational skill, and the probable higher social status of his voters.  As a 
further example of the competence in polling during the nomination contest, there 
was no consistent pattern of errors in primary polling across states. 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE STATES 
 
 Much has been made by the media during the 2008 Democratic 
nomination campaign of how different demographic factors impact Barack 
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Obama’s vote. In this section, an examination will be made of a number of 
state-level variables. First, the part that each of the factors played in the campaign 
will be discussed; then bivariate analysis of each will be discussed; finally, a 
multivariate analysis will be examined.  
 
 
Table 4:  Bivariate Relationships between State Demographic Factors and 
Obama Vote(statistical significance in parentheses) 
 
 Obama Vote Bradley Effect 
African-American Population .169 
(.247) 
.156 
(.418) 
Hispanic Population -.073 
(.620) 
.076 
(.690) 
Urban Population .119 
(.415) 
.066 
(.732) 
Elderly Population -.392 
(.005) 
-.340 
(.071) 
South -.078 
(.596) 
.141 
(.464) 
 
 (n = 49) (n = 29) 
 
 For most of the following variables, when examined alone with each of 
our target variables, Obama vote share and Bradley Effect, the relationship was in 
the hypothesized direction.  However, except in the one case noted below, all of 
the others were statistically insignificant.  
 
 African-American percent of a state’s population 
 At the beginning of the campaign, Hillary Clinton had reasons to believe 
that she would do well in the African-American community.  Her husband had 
been cited as ‘the first Black President.’ As well, she had gathered support from a 
number of black elites in Congress.  She also had in her corner in South Carolina 
an African-American minister (and state senator) whose job was to provide her 
with support from black churches in the state.  At the same time, Obama was 
being impeded in the African-American community by charges that he was not 
‘black enough’.  Her support from African-Americans began to decline when her 
aides in New Hampshire started spreading rumors that Obama may have sold 
drugs.  Then a supporter claimed that Obama was a Muslim who went to a 
madrassah.  Finally, in South Carolina, President Clinton made charges that 
many blacks found to be tinged with racism.  Another factor that helped 
Obama’s support among African-Americans was that when he won in Iowa and 
nearly was victorious in New Hampshire, blacks became convinced that he had a 
chance to win.  Although Obama gets a large share of the African-American vote 
according to exit polls, it appears to not have, at a bivariate level, any effect upon 
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his vote. Perhaps in states with a high black population, he receives generally less 
white support than in other states. 
 
 Hispanic percent of a state’s population 
 Once again, much was made of the support Clinton had in Hispanic areas 
of the nation.  It was said that this support could be traced to the Clinton name 
recognition and her husband’s presidency.  It was also reported that there was 
some level of resentment between African-Americans and Hispanics.  Thus, 
there was some likelihood that, in states with a high Hispanic population, 
Obama’s share of the vote would decline.  However, it does not seem to matter to 
either Obama’s vote share or any Bradley Effect what percentage of a state’s 
population is Hispanic. 
 
 Urbanized population  
 A hypothesis was derived that Obama’s vote share would increase as the 
percentage of a state’s population living in urban areas increases.  We posited 
that individuals who resided within metropolitan areas were more likely to 
interact with people from other cultures than those who live in rural locales. This 
would tend to increase Obama’s vote in those areas, it was thought. Although 
slightly positive, there was no recognized relationship for this variable, either. 
  
 Elderly population 
 As populations get older, generally, they were expected to be less 
receptive to change, especially in the case of an event like the groundswell for 
Obama.  There are a number of reasons for this effect.  First, older individuals 
are more likely to have typical issues with racism than are the young.  Second, 
issues that are more central to the lives of the elderly, Social Security and 
Medicare, were more central to Clinton’s message than to Obama’s.  Finally, 
much of the groundswell of enthusiasm for Obama was built on the Internet.  It 
was anticipated that seniors were less likely to be as active in this medium as were 
younger Democrats.  Therefore, as the population of a state grew older, we 
expected the relationship to be negative.  Of each of the demographic variables 
that we examined in isolation with both of the Obama vote variables, this one was 
the only one found to have a statistical significance with the Obama vote in the 
states.  
 
 South 
 Since the 1970’s, in the South, much of the white population has voted 
for the Republican Party.  Therefore, what remained as the Democratic core 
constituency in the Confederacy was the African-American vote.  We posited, 
from this, that Southern states would be more likely to have a positive relationship 
with the Obama variables.   
 
 However, although not significant, it turned out that the relationship was 
slightly negative.  That is, Obama’s percentage of the popular vote was slightly 
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less in Southern states than in the rest of the nation. 
Table 5:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 
 
 Un-standardized Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
 
T-Score 
Primary Election -13.115*** -4.01 
(3.27)  
State African American 
Population < 5 Percent 
0.868  0.27 
(3.26)  
State African American 
Population > 14 Percent 
12.885*** 3.26 
(3.96)  
Southern Region -11.718** -3.29 
(3.57)  
Percent State Population 
65 Years or older 
-3.574*** -4.52 
(0.79)  
Percent State Hispanic 
Population 
-0.195 -1.40 
(0.14)  
Post Super Tuesday 
Election 
8.379** 3.04 
(2.75)  
Constant 103.676*** 9.25 
(11.20)  
Dependent Variable = Barack Obama % of Vote 
Adjusted R-Square = 0.593 
N= 49 
*** prob < 0.001 level, one tail test 
** prob < 0.01 level, one tail test 
* prob < 0.05 level, one tail test 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF BARACK OBAMA’SSUPPORT IN THE DEMOCRATIC 
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS 
 
The preceding sections of this chapter have directly examined the role of 
the “Bradley Effect” in the 2006 congressional elections and Barack Obama’s bid 
for 2008 Democratic Presidential Nomination.  Building on the findngs of these 
preceding sections, this section aims to provide an analysis of the independent 
impact of the demographic factors put forward in the preceding chapter on the 
support Barack Obama received in each of the Democratic Presidential 
nomination contests.  In order to examine Obama’s electoral vote support we 
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forth by political pundits and our findings in the proceeding analyses.  While 
caucus states and states with large African American populations provided 
Obama with greater support, southern states and those with a larger proportion of 
senior citizens provided Barack Obama with significantly less support.  
Specifically, we find Barack Obama’s support in southern states was on average 
11 percent less than his support in non-southern states, controlling for all other 
variables.  Likewise, we find a 3.57 percent decrease in support for Barack 
Obama for every 1 percent increase in a state’s senior population.  Finally, our 
OLS analysis indicates states with small African American populations and the 
Hispanic population size of a state did not significantly impact the level of support 
which Barack Obama received in the 2008 Democratic Presidential nomination 
contests. 
 
 In Figure 1 we present Barack Obama’s predicted percent of the vote 
based on our OLS regression model versus his actual vote in each of the states 
included in our analysis.  As with our preceding analyses, this figure provides us 
with an opportunity to examine where Barack Obama out performed and or under 
performed with regard to his expected electoral support.  Based on our OLS 
regressional model, the states of Alaska and Washington should have provided 
Barak Obama with the strongest support and the states of of Oklahoma and West 
Virginia should have provided Obama with the least support.  While Obama fell 
nearly nine percentage points under his top predicted vote percent of 83 in Alaska 
and three percentage points below his predicted vote percent of 71 in the state of 
Washington, he out performed his low expected vote of 30 percent in Oklahoma 
by 1 percentage point and under performed by seven percentage points his 
expecte vote of 33 percent in West Virginia.  These results were likely due to his 
limited campaign efforts in the state of West Virginia and the substantial amount 
of campaigning which Hillary Clinton conducted in this state.  Another 
interesting issue to observe with regard to these predictions are the states which 
Obama most over peformed or under performed the model’s prediction.  Not 
surprisingly, Obama’s greatest under performance was in the two states 
(Arkansas and New York) which his strongest competitor (Hillary Clinton) has 
called home.  The only surprising state that he under performed significantly was 
Nevada, which our model suggested he should have won with 59 percent of the 
vote but actually lost by six percentage points to Hillary Clinton.  We argue his 
under performance in the Nevada primary was likely due to the substantial 
amount of campaign resources Hillary Clinton committed to this state and 
candidate Obama’s focus on the South Carolina primary which immediately 
followed the Nevada caucus.  Finally, a review of the states which Obama over 
performed provides a few surprising results.  First, he out performed his 
predicted vote by 18 percentage points in the state of Idaho.  This was likely due 
to this caucus being held on Super Tuesday and Obama’s decision to campaign in 
the small state of Idaho while other candidates ignored this state which only 
represented 23 delegates. Second, in the southern states of Alabama and Georgia 
Obama over performed his predicted vote in each state by at least ten percentage 
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points.  While he was expected to win in the state of Georgia, his victory in the 
state of Alabama was not predicted by our OLS model. 
 
 In conclusion, the results of our OLS model suggest issues of race and 
region continue to play a significant role in the Presidential election process.  
However, our results also indicate that campaign efforts and the unique appeal of 
each candidate can play a significant if not equally important role in the election 
process.   
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NOTES 
 
1 See Appendix 1 for an explanation of how the Bradley effect was calculated in 
each race. 
 
APPENDIX 1:   
 
Relationship between Obama’s Polling and Vote Percentage  
(By State Rank) 
 
State Projected Vote 
% 
Actual Vote 
% 
Difference Share 
Differential 
 
 
CO 
 
32.89 
 
66.6 
 
33.71 
 
50.61 
SC 40.68 55.4 14.72 26.57 
NV 37.72 45.2 7.48 16.54 
IA 31.88 37.5 5.62 14.98 
TX (caucus) 49.09 56 6.91 12.34 
AL 49.34 56 6.66 11.89 
WI 52.43 58.1 5.67 9.75 
GA 60.90 66.4 5.50 8.29 
VA 59.59 63.7 4.11 6.45 
CT 47.52 50.7 3.18 6.27 
MO 46.81 49.3 2.49 5.05 
IN 47.31 49.3 1.99 4.03 
OR 56.49 58.8 2.31 3.92 
NC 54.35 56.2 1.85 3.30 
NY 40.42 40.3 -.12 -.31 
OK 31.34 31.2 -.14 -.46 
NJ 45.16 43.9 -1.26 -2.87 
PA 46.72 45.4 -1.32 -2.90 
MD 62.71 60.7 -2.01 -3.32 
TN 41.92 40.5 -1.42 -3.49 
TX (primary) 49.09 47.4 -1.69 -3.56 
OH 46.19 44 -2.19 -4.97 
IL 69.88 64.7 -5.18 -8.01 
AZ 46.12 42.4 -3.72 -8.78 
CA 47.41 43.2 -4.21 -9.75 
KY 33.49 29.9 -3.59 -11.99 
MA 46.04 40.8 -5.24 -12.84 
WV 29.27 25.7 -3.57 -13.87 
NH 41.5 36.4 -5.1 -14.00 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
How Bradley Effect Was Calculated 
  
1. Obtain Real Clear Politics polling average for each candidate, their 
opponent(s) and undecided voters. 
2. Calculate the predicted score for each candidate.  The formula for this was 
the candidate’s polls + (undecided voters*candidate’s polls / (candidate’s 
polls + opponent’s polls). 
3. Obtain the election share for each candidate. 
4. Determine the difference between the election share and the predicted score. 
5. Calculate the percentage of the candidate’s vote that was gained or lost by the 
Bradley Effect. 
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